The Tom Norrid Law Firm
SAMARITAN PROJECTS LLC
Samaritan Projects P.O Box 9244
Springfeild, MO 65801
417-236-1179
The SAMARITAN-PROJECTS prepares post-conviction motions along with appeals under the direction of Attorney Tom Norrid and specializes in the preparation of compassionate release and 2255 motions. The Projects newsletter reports every winning published district court and court of appeals case for the week in review. Contacts: Rusty – 417 901 3000 – Eddie 417 818 1938.
CR.RIS/MEDICAL. The Southern District of Alabama granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Larry Mitchell, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220215 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 5, 2024). The Government brought this motion on request of the Director of the BOP, and the defendant desires the relief sought. The defendant has been diagnosed with locally advanced and inoperable hepatocellular carcinoma (liver cancer), and his oncologist estimates his life expectancy as less than twelve months. This condition, with this abbreviated life expectancy has been recognized as a terminal illness for purposes of USSG 1B1.13(b)(1)(A). The defendant’s sentence was reduced to time served.
CR.RIS/DISPARITY/CAREER OFFENDER/USSG 1B1.13(b)(6). The Southern District of Indiana granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Antonio Mendoza, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219164 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 2, 2024). In 2008, after a three day trial, a jury found Mendoza guilty of Count One: possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, a Schedule II, Non-Narcotic Controlled Substance in violation of 21 USC 841(a)(1); and Count Two: possession with the intent to distribute more than 50 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, a Schedule II, Non-Narcotic Controlled Substance in violation of 21 USC 841(a)(1). In this case, under 21 USC 841, because of the information filed under Section 851, the Court had no choice but to impose a life sentence. Mendoza filed the instant Motion for Compassionate Release, again asserting that if he "were sentenced today for the same offense he would face a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence and a Guidelines range much shorter than life imprisonment." Mendoza is now 56 years old. He argued the Court should grant his motion and "impose a sentence in accord with common sense" as "he does not deserve to die in prison." Mendoza argued he established extraordinary and compelling reasons for release because a change in the law has produced a gross disparity between the sentence he received and the sentence he would likely receive today. Mendoza relied on 1B1.13(b)(6) to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. The Court concluded that the Sentencing Commission did not extend beyond its authority in promulgating 1B1.13(b)(6). Fewer than 12% of federal offenders were sentenced to a term of 10 years or longer between 2013 and 2022, which means that 1B1.13(b)(6) potentially affords relief to a small proportion of inmates in the BOP and supports the conclusion that it applies only in extraordinary circumstances. The Court agreed that there is nothing extraordinary about a change in the law alone, but the Sentencing Commission's interpretation of the statute is reasonable because such a change may become extraordinary and compelling when combined with a long sentence, of which a decade long portion has been served, and there is large difference between the sentencing scheme the defendant faced and the one he would face if sentenced today. Mendoza is a 55-year-old man with serious health problems and no history of violence." Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement records indicate Mendoza is an illegal immigrant, and he was previously deported on December 23, 1993, and April 18, 1994, therefore, he is a likely subject to deportation following completion of the executed portion of this sentence. Life sentence reduced to 360-months imprisonment.
APPEAL/ACCA/ERLINGER. The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Joshua Williams, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 30399 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2024).
Joshua Williams appealed his 180-month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. 18 USC 922(g)(1). Williams moved for summary reversal arguing that in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 USC 924(e)(1), because a jury did not determine whether the predicate offenses for the enhancement occurred on different occasions. The Government did not oppose Williams’s motion. The Armed Career Criminal Act requires that any defendant who violates section 922(g) serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years if the defendant has 3 prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses committed on different occasions. 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). In Erlinger, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that any fact used to increase the range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed, including whether a defendant’s past offenses were committed on different occasions, must be either admitted by the defendant in a guilty plea or resolved by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 602 U.S. at 834–35. The court granted Williams’s unopposed motion for summary reversal, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing without ACCA enhancement.
APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Brandon Hayes, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 30439 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2024). Hayes appealed his conviction and 100-month sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He argued the felon-in-possession statute, 18 USC 922(g)(1), is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). He argued the district court plainly erred in calculating his sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court affirmed his conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. Hayes’s argument that 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment is foreclosed by the court’s decision in United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024). In Dubois, the court held that Rozier remained binding precedent in this Circuit after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen. 94 F.4th at 1292–93. The court agreed with both parties that the district court plainly erred in calculating Hayes’s Sentencing Guidelines range. Specifically, the district court erred by adding three criminal history points for Hayes’s 2009 Massachusetts conviction for possession of marijuana for distribution. Under the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, the court should not have added any criminal history points for the 2009 conviction because Hayes’s sentence for that offense did not exceed one year and one month, and the sentence was imposed more than ten years before Hayes committed the instant offense. USSG 4A1.1(a); 4A1.2(e)(2)-(3) (2021). This mistake in tallying Hayes’s criminal history points led to a miscalculation of his Guidelines sentencing range, so that the district court considered an incorrect, substantially higher Guidelines range when determining his sentence. Remanded for resentencing.
APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Robert Turner, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 30565 (4th Cir. Dec. 4, 2024). Turner pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm after police seized a gun from a car in which he was sitting. Turner challenged the denial of his motion to suppress the gun on Fourth Amendment grounds arguing that the search was unlawful. He also contended that inconsistencies between the supervised-release conditions announced at his sentencing and those in his written judgment constituted an error. The Middle District of North Carolina denied Turner’s motion to suppress holding that the search of the car was a lawful search incident to arrest under Arizona v. Gant. The court found that it was reasonable to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the crime of arrest. Turner then pled guilty but reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. At sentencing, the district court adopted a Sentencing Guidelines advisory range of 46 to 57 months based on an offense level of 19 and seven criminal history points placing Turner in criminal history category IV. Turner was sentenced to 57 months imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress agreeing that the search was justified under Gant. The court found no Fourth Amendment violation. However, the court vacated Turner’s sentence due to a miscalculation of his criminal history score which resulted in an incorrect advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. The court remanded the case for resentencing under the correct range. The court also found no material discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment regarding the supervised-release conditions, thus no error under United States v. Rogers.
APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing United States v. Ahmad Abouammo, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 30558 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2024). Abouammo is a former employee of Twitter who was accused of providing confidential information about dissident Saudi Twitter users to Bader Binasaker, an associate of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In exchange, Abouammo received a luxury wristwatch and substantial payments. A jury convicted Abouammo of acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government, conspiracy to commit wire and honest services fraud, wire and honest services fraud, international money laundering, and falsification of records to obstruct a federal investigation. The Northern District of California presided over the initial trial. Abouammo was found guilty on multiple counts, including acting as an unregistered agent and falsifying records. He was sentenced to 42 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and forfeiture of $242,000. Abouammo appealed his convictions and sentence arguing insufficient evidence, improper venue, and that some charges were time-barred. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Abouammo’s convictions, holding that sufficient evidence supported his conviction under 18 USC 951 for acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government. The court found that Abouammo acted under the direction and control of the Saudi government, regardless of whether Binasaker was a foreign "official." The court also rejected Abouammo’s statute of limitations argument holding that the superseding indictment was timely under 18 USC 3288. Additionally, the court held that venue for the falsification of records charge was proper in the Northern District of California where the obstructed federal investigation was taking place. The Ninth Circuit vacated Abouammo’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, but affirmed his convictions on all counts.
APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded United States Juan Vega-Santos, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 30922 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 2024). In June 2022, Juan Jose Vega-Santos was charged with illegal reentry into the United States following removal, under 8 USC 1326(a)–(b). He pled guilty without a plea agreement. The district court sentenced him to 60 months in prison, an upward variance from the advisory guidelines range, and imposed three years of supervised release with special conditions, including a requirement to undergo a psychosexual evaluation and participate in sex offender treatment if recommended by an evaluator. The Western District of Texas imposed the special condition as part of Vega-Santos's supervised release due to his prior felony conviction for sexual intercourse with a minor. Vega-Santos did not challenge this condition in the district court. On appeal, he argued the condition constituted an unlawful delegation of the district court’s sentencing authority and was impermissibly ambiguous. The Fifth Circuit held that the special condition requiring Vega-Santos to participate in sex offender treatment if recommended by an evaluator constituted an unlawful delegation of judicial authority. The court noted that the imposition of a sentence, including the terms and conditions of supervised release, is a core judicial function that cannot be delegated. The court found that the district court's error was clear or obvious and affected Vega-Santos's substantial rights. The error also seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated the special condition and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing consistent with its opinion.
APPEAL/EXCLUDE EXPERT/SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT. The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Reginald Graham, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 30382 (11th Cir. Dec. 2, 2024). The case involves Reginald Graham, Antonio Glass, Jerimaine Bryant, Mario Rodriguez, Torivis Reginald Ingram, Michael Walker, Levi Bryant, Curtis Bryant, Daniel Jones, and Samuel Hayes, who were convicted of various crimes related to their involvement in the Dub Street Blood Family (DSBF), a Miami-based gang. The gang engaged in drug trafficking, armed robberies, and murders for over nearly two decades. The FBI, ATF, and local police departments conducted extensive investigations leading to a broad indictment and subsequent trial. In the Southern District of Florida, the defendants were charged with multiple offenses, including racketeering conspiracy and narcotics conspiracy. After a 38-day trial, the jury found the defendants guilty on several counts, resulting in sentences ranging from 168 months to life imprisonment. The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences raising numerous issues. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the Count 1 RICO conspiracy convictions due to the district court's erroneous exclusion of the defendants gang expert and the Government's failure to address harmless error. The court also vacated Daniel Jones sentence due to the improper application of a use-of-violence enhancement. In all other respects, the court affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court addressed various challenges, including the sufficiency of the indictment, the denial of motions to suppress, the denial of a motion to sever, Batson challenges, and several evidentiary rulings. The court found no reversible error in the district court's handling of these issues except for the exclusion of the defense expert and the sentencing error for Daniel Jones.
APPEAL/JURY INSTRUCTIONS. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded for new trial United States v. Wayne Lozier, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 30662 (8th Cir. Dec. 5, 2024). Wayne Lozier, Jr., a licensed bounty hunter in Louisiana traveled to Missouri to detain a fugitive, R.C., who had failed to appear for her court date in Louisiana. Lozier entered a residence in Missouri, handcuffed R.C., and transported her towards Mississippi. During this time the residence owner alerted law enforcement, leading to an investigation by Officer Jeffrey Atkins. Lozier was found to have violated Missouri laws by not being licensed in Missouri and failing to notify local law enforcement before apprehending R.C. A federal grand jury indicted Lozier for kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap. Lozier moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing his actions were lawful as an agent of a bail bondsman. The Eastern District of Missouri denied these motions stating Lozier's arguments were factual challenges. At trial, Lozier admitted to the Missouri law violations but contended his actions were standard fugitive apprehension. He objected to a jury instruction that he claimed deprived the jury of deciding whether his actions were unlawful. The jury found Lozier guilty on both counts and he was sentenced to 120 months on each count, to run concurrently. The Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the jury instruction (Instruction 16) created a conclusive presumption that Lozier acted unlawfully by violating Missouri law, thus removing the jury's ability to consider justification or excuse. This violated Lozier's due process rights. The court held that this error was not harmless and vacated Lozier's convictions and remanding the case for a new trial.
SUPERVISED RELEASE TERMINATION. The Western District of North Carolina granted termination in United States v. Leslie Cartwright, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220670 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 5, 2024). This was before the Court upon the defendant's letter which is construed as a motion for early termination of supervised release. The defendant moved for the early termination of her supervised release. Neither counsel for the Government nor the defendant's supervising officer opposed the defendant's request. In light of the lack of opposition from counsel for the Government and the defendant's supervising probation officer, the Court was satisfied that the early termination of the defendant's supervised release was warranted by the defendant's conduct and is in the interest of justice. 18 USC 3583(e)(1). United States v. Jeramie McSweeney, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220672 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 5, 2024) (same).
SUPERVISED RELEASE TERMINATION. The Eastern District of Louisiana granted termination in United States v. Azizi Ansari, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219073 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 2024). On Nov. 7, 2007, Ansari pled guilty to a one-count Bill of Information charging him with conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute quantities of ecstasy in violation of 21 USC 846. On Feb. 25, 2010, Ansari was sentenced to 240 months. Ansari argued that termination was warranted because he had successfully complied with all terms and conditions of supervision for a full year. More specifically, he noted that he has: (1) never failed a random urine analysis test, (2) maintained gainful employment since the day of his release from the halfway house, (3) maintained a consistent residence at the same location all on his own, and (4) been available to probation at all times, including office and home visits with his assigned probation officer. He further argued he has faced hardships associated with his supervision due to the travel restrictions that prevent him from visiting his family who live out of state and from utilizing his Class A Commercial Driver's License outside of the district. A district court can terminate supervised release at any time after one year. The Court noted that he has faithfully complied with all terms of his supervision for over a year, and neither probation nor the Government refute his good conduct. Moreover, this outcome will allow Ansari to potentially earn a higher income by removing the travel restrictions that are currently affecting his commercial driver's license. Court granted termination.
SUPERVISED RELEASE TERMINATION. The District of Montana granted termination in United States v. Jonathon Farran, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206294 (D. Mont. Nov. 13, 2024). On May 25, 2017, defendant was sentenced for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 USC 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B). The Court sentenced defendant to 72 months of imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release. (Defendant began serving his current term of supervision on Jan. 14, 2022. Defendant argued his supervised release should be terminated because he has reformed his character. While incarcerated, he completed the RDAP program, an electrical apprenticeship, and multiple other classes. After defendant was released, he started his own business, bought a new truck, and made friends that are sober. Importantly, defendant has complied with all the conditions of his supervised release with the exception of one alcohol-related violation. It is evident to the Court that defendant is committed to sobriety and self-improvement. The Court believed the defendant can live a productive and law-abiding life without the supervision of the Court. Thus, in weighing "the nature and circumstances of the offense" against the "characteristics" of defendant, along with the need to promote "deterrence" and "protect the public," the Court agreed with the defendant that continued supervision was no longer necessary.
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