The Law Office of Tom Norrid
SAMARITAN PROJECTS LLC
P.O. Box 9244
Springfield, MO 65801-9244
417-236-1179
The SAMARITAN-PROJECTS prepares post-conviction and compassionate release motions along with appeals under the direction of Attorney Tom Norrid. The Samaritan-Projects’ newsletter reports every winning published district court and court of appeals case for the week in review. Rusty – 417 901 3000 – Eddie 417 818 1938.
APPEAL/CR.RIS/SEXUAL ASSAULT. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Darnell Nash, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20816 (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 2024). Darnell Nash, aka Slayana Berts, is a transgender woman currently incarcerated at the U.S. Penitentiary Terre Haute, a men’s prison. Nash, proceeding pro se, appealed the district court’s order denying her 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) emergency motion for compassionate release. She moved the court to take judicial notice and for reassignment of this action to a new district judge. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. In 2020, Nash filed the first in a series of 3582(c) motions, asserting that prisoners and a correctional officer had raped her on more than 135 occasions and that the rapes had continued. Nash filed the 3582(c) motion at issue here, asserting that she now has been raped 156 times and was sexually abused repeatedly by two male inmates over a six-week period beginning near the end of July 2023, which was right around the time the district court denied her prior 3582(c) motion. Nash asserted that prison officials at Terre Haute routinely ignored sexual abuse, delay investigating it, or covered it up by writing false incident reports against the victims and sending them to segregation. Finding that Nash had previously sought relief on the same or similar grounds through multiple filings, and multiple appeals, the district court denied her 3582(c) motion. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court’s lack of consideration of new allegations of rape reflects a complete disregard for these new allegations, seemingly concluding that no amount of sexual violence, no matter how severe or frequent, could justify compassionate release. Therefore, the district court failed to give due consideration to the 3553(a) factors when rendering its decision. Because reassignment of Nash’s prior case to a new district judge was appropriate, the court concluded that reassignment of this case is appropriate as well to avoid compromising the appearance of justice. For these reasons, the court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the action for further proceedings consistent with this decision. The court granted Nash’s motion for reassignment to a different district judge.
CR.RIS/MEDICAL. The Southern District of Indiana granted the CR.RIS motion in United States v. Lisa Raines, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145442 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2024). In July 2023, Raines pled guilty to one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 USC 1343. Between March 2006 and Nov. 2016, Ms. Raines was employed as a Senior Finance Technician by Seven Corners, Inc., a privately held international travel insurance and specialty benefit management company headquartered in Carmel, Indiana. During her employment, Raines caused Seven Corners to make 65 payments totaling over $2,000,000 to a phony business vendor that she had set up for the purpose of defrauding Seven Corners. These payments were received by a bank account that Raines had opened and controlled for the purpose of perpetrating fraud on Seven Corners. She used the proceeds of her fraudulent scheme to fund a lavish lifestyle, purchasing, for example, a boat, a car, and a house. The Court sentenced Raines to 57 months. Raines filed an amended motion and a supplemental reply which included medical records showing that she has since been diagnosed with Stage IV renal cancer. Medical records indicate that certain treatments may extend her lifespan but it's "difficult to predict" how long she has to live. The court found that Raines had shown that her cancer is terminal under the Guidelines—it has metastasized, has a low survival rate, and has an end-of-life trajectory. In this context, that's sufficient for the Court to find extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. Raines is not required to show that the BOP is not providing adequate medical care. Sentence reduced to time served.
CR.RIS/USSG 1B1.13(b)(6)/FAMILY CIRCUMSTANCES. The Central District of Illinois granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Anthony Lyons, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144703 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2024). On March 27, 2012, a jury convicted Lyons of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 USC 922(g)(1). Lyons was sentenced to 210 months. Defendant sought compassionate release due to an unusually long sentence and a need to care for his mother. Defendant argued the incapacitation of his parent when he would be the only available caregiver for the parent, specifically, his 78-year-old mother, warrants compassionate release. The Court found that the need for the defendant to care for his ailing mother presented extraordinary and compelling circumstances. If sentenced today, Lyons would not face an Armed Career Criminal enhancement, but he would face a 10-year mandatory minimum. The defendant has applied himself to programming and has stayed relatively out of trouble since 2017. Although there have been disciplinary infractions, seven over the course of approximately thirteen years is not a large number. These infractions included: being absent from assignment, interfering with taking count, fighting, threatening bodily harm, possessing drugs or alcohol, giving or accepting money, and phone abuse. The defendant’s sentence was reduced to time served.
CR.RIS/REHABILITATION/DISPARITY. The District of Maryland granted in part a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Todd Bell, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146344 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 2024). Bell is currently serving a sentence of 332 months for his involvement in a string of armed robberies that occurred between Dec. 2008 and March 2009. Bell pled guilty to Counts Three and Five which charged him with two counts of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 USC 924(c), in relation to a string of armed robberies that Bell engaged in with two co-conspirators between Dec. 2008 and March 2009. Bell was originally sentenced to 384 months. The Court subsequently reduced Bell's sentence to 332 months to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between Bell and his co-defendant Quindell Ford pursuant to 18 USC 3553(b)(6). Bell contended a change in the law, unusually harsh prison conditions, circumstances caused by COVID-19, and his rehabilitative efforts establish extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying his early release. Bell's Motion was denied with respect to his request for a time served sentence, but was granted as to a sentence reduction. Bell's sentence was reduced from 332 months to 308 months.
THE PROJECT PREPARED THIS MOTION.
CR.RIS/MEDICAL. The Southern District of Illinois granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Jerry Crontz, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144162 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2024). Crontz was sentenced to 60 months for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine, and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Crontz is currently housed at FMC Butner with an anticipated release date of March 1, 2027. Crontz'srelease has been recommended by the facility warden due to his terminal health status. It is undisputed that Crontz has Stage 4 non-small cell lung cancer and has a life expectancy of less than a year and he is significantly debilitated. It is also undisputed that his terminal condition constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting compassionate release. Moreover, the Court found the 18 USC 3553(a) factors also weigh in favor of Crontz's release as he is unlikely to commit additional crimes if released. He has been incarcerated for almost two years, including his time in custody prior to sentencing. Thus, the sentencing objectives of just punishment and specific deterrence have been satisfied. Crontz has a suitable home plan and a supportive family. The defendant’s sentence was reduced to time served.
CR.RIS/REHABILITATION/CHANGE IN THE LAW. The Eastern District of California granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Gerardo Delgado-Garibay, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142999 (E.D. Calif. Aug. 12, 2024). Gerardo Delgado-Garibay moved for compassionate release under 28 USC 3582(c)(1)(A). He is currently serving a term of life. He made multiple arguments that his sentence should be amended. He argued that intervening changes in law make a reduction in his sentence appropriate, that the 2-level offense enhancement for having a weapon at the scene of the crime was inapplicable and that he is at increased risk because of the COVID-19 pandemic, and he has made significant efforts toward rehabilitation during the last 29 years. Finally, he argued the sentencing factors, set forth in 18 USC 3553(a), favor a lesser sentence. Delgado-Garibay argued he has made significant rehabilitation efforts during his incarceration. He received his GED in 1996 and is now proficient in English. At the time the instant motion was filed, he had taken nearly 40 classes. His last reported incident was over 20 years ago. Courts have held that changes in sentencing law, including the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, and their application cannot be mandatory, coupled with the enactment of the FSA—can constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant compassionate release. He cited Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (finding that factors increasing the statutory maximum of a sentence must be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt rather than a preponderance of the evidence by the judge), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (making the sentencing guidelines advisory rather than mandatory). Delgado-Garibay argued that "if [he] were resentenced, he would not be looking at anything close to a life sentence." The defendant is approaching his 57th birthday and suffers from many medical conditions, which commonly affect people his age. The defendant now admits full responsibility for the conduct which caused his incarceration and expresses his deep remorse. The defendant’s sentence was reduced to time served.
APPEAL/AMENDMENT 821. The Sixth Circuit remanded United States v. Gregory Ralston, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20198 (6th Cir. Aug. 12, 2024). Ralston was found guilty by a jury of distributing and possessing with intent to distribute a fentanyl-containing substance. He was acquitted of causing serious bodily injury by distributing the fentanyl. Ralston challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence without an evidentiary hearing, the limitation of his cross-examination of two government witnesses, and the reasonableness of his 180-month sentence. The Northern District of Ohio initially scheduled an evidentiary hearing on Ralston’s motion to suppress but later denied the motion without holding the hearing. Ralston proceeded to trial, where the court limited his cross-examination of witnesses regarding potential bias and prior convictions. The jury convicted Ralston on the drug charges but acquitted him of the enhancement for causing serious bodily injury. The district court then imposed a 180-month sentence, significantly above the Guidelines range of 27 to 33 months, citing Ralston’s prior conviction and the seriousness of the current offense. The Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress without an evidentiary hearing as the issues raised were legal rather than factual. The appellate court also upheld the limitation on cross-examination, noting that Ralston had the opportunity to question the witnesses directly about potential bias. The court found the sentence procedurally reasonable as the district court adequately explained the upward variance and considered the 3553(a) factors. The court also found the sentence substantively reasonable given the district court’s rationale and the evidence supporting the findings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment but remanded the case for consideration of a potential sentence reduction under 18 USC 3582(c)(2) due to an intervening amendment in the Sentencing Guidelines. Amendment 821.
AMENDMENT 821. The Western District of Kentucky granted an 821 motion in United States v. Dahntel Newsome, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144694 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 14, 2024). Newsome is eligible for a reduction in status points, resulting in a recalculated three criminal history points-Criminal History Category II. Newsome was sentenced to 243-months. Sentence reduced to 236-months.
APPEAL/2255/IAC/ILLEGAL SEARCH. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded Harson Chong v. United States, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20467 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2024). A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy entered the curtilage of Harson Chong’s home without a warrant, leading to the discovery of drugs, guns, and money. Chong and Tac Tran, who was present at the home, were subsequently charged with federal drug and gun offenses. They claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys did not object to the search on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Central District of California initially denied their suppression motions, ruling the search justified by the parole-search exception. However, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Grandberry, the district court reversed, finding insufficient probable cause that Tran resided at Chong’s home. Despite this, the court upheld the search based on exigent circumstances. Chong and Tran were convicted, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. They then filed post-conviction motions under 28 USC 2255 which the district court denied, finding no ineffective assistance of counsel. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the deputy’s entry onto the curtilage without a warrant, consent, or exigency was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found Chong’s counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence as the search was clearly unlawful. However, Tran lacked standing to challenge the search as he did not reside at Chong’s home and was merely a visitor. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Chong’s 2255 motion and remanded for relief, but affirmed the denial of Tran’s motion.
APPEAL/2255/EVIDENTIARY HEARING. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Richard Wilford, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20643 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 2024). Wilford appealed the district court’s order denying relief on his 28
USC 2255 motion. The court previously granted a partial certificate of appealability and directed informal briefing on the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing before denying relief on Wilford’s claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the plea process. Upon review of the parties’ submissions and the record, the court dismissed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. In a signed declaration attached to his 2255 motion Wilford claimed he declined a plea deal based on counsel’s advice that a pending motion to suppress had a “good chance of winning.” The district court found that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary to resolve this claim because the motion to suppress, although ultimately unsuccessful, was not frivolous, and the relevant records established that Wilford intended to proceed to trial regardless of counsel’s advice. However, given the existing law at the time, the court concluded that it would have been unreasonable to characterize the suppression motion—which challenged law enforcement’s use of GPS tracking and cell phone location data—as having a “good chance” of success. See United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 335-38 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to certain evidence obtained through warrantless use of GPS devices prior to relevant changes in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). Moreover, the plea deal set forth a sentence of around eight years, whereas Wilford was sentenced to a much lengthier term of imprisonment following trial. Accordingly, the court concluded that Wilford presented a colorable claim that counsel’s representation during the plea negotiations was both deficient and prejudicial.
APPEAL/2254/IAC. The Third Circuit affirmed the grant of habeas relief in Eddie Williams v. Superintendent Greene, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20301 (3d Cir. Aug. 13, 2024). In 2015, Eddie Williams was prosecuted in Pennsylvania for crimes related to a drug dispute that resulted in one death and one serious injury. Williams, along with Rick Cannon and Akeita Harden, was implicated in the incident. Cannon pleaded guilty to twenty charges, including homicide and conspiracy, some of which named Williams as a coconspirator. During Williams's trial, his attorney misrepresented Cannon's plea, leading the judge to read Cannon's entire Criminal Information to the jury, which included references to Williams as a coconspirator. Williams was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment plus additional years. He filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's actions. The PCRA court denied relief finding no Confrontation Clause violation and concluding that the attorney's strategy was reasonable. The Superior Court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further appeal. Williams then filed a habeas corpus petition in the Middle District of Pennsylvania which granted relief, finding that the reading of Cannon's Criminal Information violated the Confrontation Clause and that Williams's counsel was ineffective for not objecting. The Commonwealth appealed this decision. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the reading of Cannon's Criminal Information, which included references to Williams was testimonial and violated the Confrontation Clause. The court also found that Williams's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the reading which prejudiced Williams's defense. The court concluded that these errors had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict, warranting habeas relief.
APPEAL/2254/IAC. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded Deandre Johnson v. Dotson, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20648 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 2024). Johnson appealed from the district court’s final order and judgment adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation dismissing his 28 USC 2254 petition. The court previously granted a certificate of appealability on the following issue: Whether the magistrate judge’s finding that Johnson’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims were unexhausted and procedurally defaulted is debatable or wrong. After further briefing the court vacated the district court’s final order and judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The Commonwealth asserted that Johnson never raised his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims in the district court. But the record does not bear this out. After Johnson filed his 2254 petition he moved on May 19, 2021, to supplement the petition by incorporating the state habeas petition. The state habeas petition, filed in the Supreme Court of Virginia, included the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims, which the court proceeded to decide on the merits. In the motion to supplement, Johnson added claims that appellate counsel was ineffective by: (1) presenting claims on direct appeal that were not raised in the trial court; (2) refusing to remove himself; and (3) failing to raise the following issues that were raised in the trial court: (a) the prosecution did not exclude defendant’s theory that he never penetrated the victim and his DNA would be absent from the victim’s vagina; (b) the victim’s testimony was inherently incredible; (c) the trial court refused to admit material impeachment evidence, violating Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); (d) the prosecution knowingly presented false testimony violating Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); (e) the offense of assault and battery is the lesser included offense of strangulation; and (f) the prosecution failed to show the defendant had the necessary specific intent. The magistrate judge granted Johnson’s motion to supplement and acknowledged that Johnson was seeking to add additional ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
APPEAL/2254/IAC. The Ninth Circuit remanded Patrick Neiss v. Bludworth, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22-35877 ((9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2024). Patrick Neiss was convicted in Montana state court of deliberate homicide and evidence tampering, based on circumstantial evidence. He filed a pro se federal habeas petition under 28 USC 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Neiss argued that his trial counsel failed to challenge the particularity of a search warrant, which led to the discovery of silencer-related internet searches on his computer, and that his appellate counsel failed to raise this issue on appeal. The District of Montana dismissed Neiss’s habeas petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which allows for preliminary screening of habeas petitions. The district court adjudicated the petition on the merits, concluding that Neiss’s trial counsel was not deficient because they had made multiple attempts to suppress the evidence, albeit not on the particularity grounds. The court did not find the petition procedurally defective or frivolous. Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Rule 4 standard, which is intended to screen out only those petitions that are procedurally defective or frivolous. The court emphasized that Rule 4 does not permit summary dismissal on the merits. The Ninth Circuit found that Neiss’s petition alleged a cognizable, non-frivolous claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which should not have been dismissed summarily. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded United States v. Julian Manzano, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20315 (10th Cir. Aug. 13, 2024). Julian Manzano was pulled over by Oklahoma City police on March 26, 2022, just twenty-five days after being released from a thirteen-year prison sentence. During the stop, officers smelled burnt marijuana and found a .45 caliber pistol and ammunition in his car. Manzano admitted ownership of the firearm. Due to a prior 2009 conviction for second-degree murder in Oklahoma he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 USC 922(g)(1) and pled guilty. The Western District of Oklahoma sentenced Manzano, applying a higher base offense level based on the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) which classified his prior second-degree murder conviction as a "crime of violence" under USSG 4B1.2(a)(2). Manzano objected, arguing that his prior conviction did not meet the criteria for a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines. The district court disagreed and sentenced him to 27 months in prison. The Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Oklahoma's second-degree murder statute, which includes homicides committed during the commission of any felony, does not categorically match the federal definition of "murder" under the Guidelines. The federal definition requires the underlying felony to be "dangerous," whereas Oklahoma law allows for potentially dangerous felonies to qualify. This broader scope means that Oklahoma second-degree murder criminalizes more conduct than the federal definition of "murder." Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing finding that Manzano's prior conviction should not have been classified as a "crime of violence" under USSG 4B1.2(a)(2).
APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Eleventh Circuit remanded for resentencing United States v. Mitzi Bickers, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20503 (11th Cir. Aug. 14, 2024). Mitzi Bickers was convicted of conspiratorial bribery under 18 USC 371 (Count 1), three counts of money laundering under 18 USC 1957 (Counts 4–6), four counts of wire fraud under 18 USC 1343, 1349 (Counts 7–10), and filing a false tax return under 26 USC 7206 (Count 12). The evidence at trial established that Bickers as an employee with the City of Atlanta accepted bribes to influence the selection of certain contractors for Atlanta’s sidewalk repair, bridge repair, and snow removal projects. The contractors, in turn, inflated their bids to personally profit and to cover Bickers’ bribe amounts, costing Atlanta millions of dollars. Bickers argued on appeal that numerous district court decisions made at her trial and sentencing were incorrect, including: (I) That the district court abused its discretion in limiting
the scope of cross-examination as to E.R. Mitchell, Jr. (II) That the district court abused its discretion in denying Bickers’ motion for a curative instruction. (III) That the district court abused its discretion in denying Bickers’ motion for mistrial. (IV) That the district court erred in denying Bickers’ motion for judgment of acquittal. (V) That the district court erred in overruling Bickers’ sentencing objections. Regarding Issue (IV) whether the district court erred in denying Bickers’ motion for judgment of acquittal, the Government concedes that the wire fraud counts, Counts 7–10 are due to be withdrawn in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Kelly v. United States, 590 U.S. 391, 398–403 (2020) and Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 306, 312–316 (2023). Even so, the withdrawal of those counts does not require a new trial because the evidence supporting those counts did not cause prejudicial spillover to the remaining conviction counts. Therefore, the court determined that Counts 7–10 should be vacated, and Bickers should receive a limited resentencing reflecting the removed counts. The court affirmed Bickers’ convictions on Counts 1, 4–6, and 12. But vacated Counts 7–10, the wire fraud counts, and remanded back to the district court for limited resentencing.
APPEAL/RETURN OF PROPERTY/RULE 41(g). The District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded Oyoma Asinor v. District of Columbia, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20098 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 2024). The appellants in this case were arrested by the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) during protests in August 2020. Upon arrest, their personal property, including cell phones, was seized. They were released without charges, but their property was not returned for months or even over a year, despite repeated requests. The appellants filed motions under D.C. Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) to recover their property, which led to the return of some items after significant delays. They then sued the District of Columbia in federal court, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and common-law conversion, and sought damages and injunctive relief. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaints. It held that the plaintiffs failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim because the initial seizure was reasonable and any challenge to continued retention was governed by the Fifth Amendment. The court also found that Rule 41(g) provided adequate process for the Fifth Amendment claim. Consequently, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the conversion claim and denied class certification as moot. The District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Fourth Amendment requires that any continued retention of personal property seized incident to a lawful arrest must be reasonable. The court found that the prolonged retention of the appellants' property without a legitimate investigatory or protective purpose could constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The court reversed the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claims, vacated the dismissal of the D.C.-law claims and the denial of class certification, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
APPEAL/1983/FIRST AMENDMENT. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded Lamar v. Payne, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19452 (8th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024). An inmate in the Arkansas Department of Corrections (ADC) filed a pro se 42 USC 1983 action, alleging that several ADC employees retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. The inmate claimed retaliation occurred after he filed a grievance, circulated a memorandum encouraging other inmates to file grievances against a new administrative directive, and threatened a lawsuit. The directive in question imposed a three-page limit on non-privileged correspondence between inmates and non-incarcerated individuals. The inmate was charged with rule violations, placed in isolation, and later moved to administrative segregation. The Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that they had valid, non-retaliatory reasons for their actions, as the inmate had violated prison rules. The district court also denied the inmate's request for an extension of time to file his own summary judgment motion, citing a lack of good cause and the age of the case. The inmate appealed both decisions. The Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that the inmate’s circulation of the memorandum was protected conduct under the First Amendment and that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a security concern justifying the disciplinary actions. The court also found that the district court erred in relying on a written charge of a rule violation that was dismissed on procedural grounds and on the inmate’s deposition testimony given years later. However, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of the inmate’s request for an extension of time to file a summary judgment motion, finding no abuse of discretion.
APPEAL/1983/DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded Steven Pinder v. Wellpath, LLC, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20008 (8th Cir. Aug. 8, 2024). An Arkansas inmate, Steven Pinder, filed a lawsuit under 42 USC 1983 alleging that various defendants, including Wellpath, LLC, and its employees, were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs which violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Pinder sought declaratory and injunctive relief and substantial damages for several medical issues, including severe glaucoma, peptic ulcers, acid reflux, diabetes, and an orthopedic condition in his right shoulder. The district court granted summary judgment to two defendants on the shoulder claim and dismissed other claims for failure to establish in forma pauperis (IFP) status. The Eastern District of Arkansas initially denied Pinder's IFP status due to his "three strikes" under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which bars prisoners with three prior dismissals for frivolous or malicious claims from proceeding IFP unless they are in imminent danger of serious physical injury. Pinder filed a declaration asserting imminent danger, which the magistrate judge partially accepted, allowing some claims to proceed. The district court adopted these recommendations but later revoked IFP status for most claims based on new evidence, ultimately granting summary judgment on the remaining shoulder claim. The Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court remanded the motion to revoke Pinder's IFPstatus to the district court for further consideration, particularly in light of new medical evidence. The appellate court also remanded the issue of whether the interlocutory dismissals were proper, given a recent Eighth Circuit opinion. The court did not rule on the summary judgment at this time, vacating the district court's judgment and remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
APPEAL/1983/FALSE IMPRISONMENT. The District of Columbia Circuit vacated and remanded Jose Vasquez v. Agosto, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20097 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2024). Jose Vasquez was detained twice by the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) because he shares the same name and birthdate as a wanted criminal. He sued the District of Columbia and an officer for constitutional violations under 42 USC 1983, and the District alone for negligence, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment. The District Court granted summary judgment on the Section 1983 and negligence claims. The jury found the District liable for false imprisonment but not for malicious prosecution, awarding Vasquez $100,000. However, the District Court later granted the District's motion for judgment as a matter of law, nullifying the jury's award, and alternatively granted a motion for remittitur. The District of Columbia initially reviewed the case. It granted summary judgment in favor of the District and Officer Agosto on the Section 1983 claims, finding no constitutional violations. The court also dismissed the negligence claim. The jury trial on the common law claims resulted in a mixed verdict, with the jury awarding damages for false imprisonment but not for malicious prosecution. The District Court subsequently overturned the jury's verdict on false imprisonment and reduced the damages awarded. The District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's summary judgment on the Section 1983 claims, agreeing that there was no clearly established constitutional violation and that qualified immunity applied to Officer Agosto. However, the appellate court vacated the District Court's judgment as a matter of law and the alternative remittitur on the false imprisonment claim. The appellate court reinstated the jury's verdict and remanded for further proceedings, emphasizing that the jury could reasonably find that the differing social security numbers indicated Vasquez was not the wanted criminal, and that the jury's damages award was justified based on the emotional harm suffered.
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