SAMARITAN NEWSLETTER – 03- 24, 2025

Satellite Law Office of Tom Norrid

SAMARITAN PROJECTS LLC 

4415 Gladstone Blvd.

Kansas City, MO 64123

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The SAMARITAN-PROJECT prepares post-conviction and compassionate release motions under the direction of Attorney Tom Norrid. The Project retrieves documents at reasonable prices. The Project newsletter reports every winning published district court and court of appeals case for the week in review.

CR.RIS/YOUTH/REHABILITATION. The Western District of Pennsylvania granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Robinson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49395 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2025). Robinson was sentenced to a statutorily mandated minimum sentence of 32 years after pleading guilty to two counts of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 USC 924(c), and four counts of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 USC 2113(d). This spree commenced when he was 16 years old and ended just two weeks after his 17th birthday. Robinson presented a combination of circumstances that, when considered together, amount to extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence: (1) his juvenile status at the time of his offenses, (2) the transfer of his case to federal district court for prosecution as an adult, and (3) the rehabilitative progress he has made in light of being incarcerated with adults as a juvenile. Moreover, the factors set forth in 3553(a) weigh in favor of his requested relief. Robinson has shown that a sentence reduction is consistent with the United States Sentencing Commission's applicable policy statements. Turning to the extraordinary and compelling reasons Robinson presented, the court found that his age at the time he committed the underlying offenses weighs heavily in favor of granting compassionate release. Because Robinson demonstrated his eligibility for relief under the catchall provision in 1B1.13(b)(5), the court did not decide whether he was entitled to relief under the "unusually long sentence" provision in paragraph (b)(6). Defendant’s sentence reduced to time served.

APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Paige Thompson, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 6178 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 2025). Thompson committed a significant data breach, hacking into Amazon Web Services (AWS) customers' accounts, stealing data from at least 30 entities, and causing tens of millions of dollars in damage. She used the stolen credentials to mine crypto- currency further increasing the financial impact on the victims. The Western District of Washington calculated Thompson's sentencing range under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be 168 to 210 months of imprisonment. The court granted a substantial downward variance, sentencing her to time served (approximately 100 days) and five years of probation. The court emphasized Thompson's personal history, including her transgender identity, autism, and past trauma, as significant factors in its decision. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found the district court over-emphasized Thompson's personal story and failed to properly weigh several of the 18 USC 3553(a) factors. The appellate court held the district court's findings regarding Thompson's lack of malicious intent, her remorse, and the seriousness of her actions were clearly erroneous and not supported by the record. The Ninth Circuit noted the district court did not adequately consider the need for general and specific deterrence or the risk of unwarranted sentencing disparities.

The Ninth Circuit vacated Thompson's sentence and remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to properly weigh all relevant factors and provide a more substantial justification for any variance from the Guidelines.

APPEAL/OVER DETENTION. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded Jeffrey Herrera v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5994 (3d Cir. Mar. 14, 2025). Herrera filed a pro se complaint alleging he was detained for several months beyond his maximum release date, which he claimed violated the Eighth Amendment. The Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed Herrera’s complaint under 28 USC 1915(e), reasoning his claim must be brought as a habeas corpus petition under 28 USC 2254 and that his claim for damages was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The court found that any amendment to the complaint would be futile. Herrera’s motions for reconsideration and relief from judgment were denied, with the court maintaining that his claim was barred by Heck and the statute of limitations. The Third Circuit determined Heck does not apply to Herrera’s over detention claim because it does not imply that his conviction or sentence were invalid. The court found Herrera plausibly pleaded an Eighth Amendment over detention claim, as he alleged that prison officials were aware of his over detention and failed to act, resulting in his prolonged detention. However, the court noted that the claim might be time-barred under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations but remanded the case to allow Herrera to amend his complaint to address potential tolling of the statute of limitations. The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.

APPEAL/MULTIPLICITY. The First Circuit vacated convictions in United States v. Jorge Armenteros-Chervoni, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 6529 (1st Cir. Mar. 20, 2025). In 2023, Armenteros-Chervoni, an attorney in Puerto Rico, was convicted of five offenses. The convictions stemmed from a visit to a correctional institution in the Commonwealth. Three convictions were for making materially false statements, and two were for attempting to provide prohibited objects to an inmate. The district court denied Armenteros's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on multiplicity grounds stating such a dismissal was premature. The Government presented testimony from an inmate about prior smuggling operations and the demand for contraband in the prison. The jury found Armenteros guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to nine months of imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, along with supervised release and special assessments. The First Circuit agreed with Armenteros that two of the three false statement convictions and one of the two prohibited object convictions were multiplicitous. The court vacated these convictions and their corresponding sentences. 

APPEAL/MEDICAL/BIVENS. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded Kevin Brooks v. Richardson, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 6071 (7th Cir. Mar. 14, 2025). Brooks is an inmate at a federal prison camp who suffered from appendicitis which was misdiagnosed by medical personnel as constipation and COVID-19. Despite his worsening condition he was not sent to a hospital for over ten days, resulting in a ruptured appendix and peritonitis. Brooks eventually recovered but experienced severe pain during the ordeal. He filed a lawsuit seeking damages from five federal employees, three of whom treated him and two who were supervisors. The Northern District of Illinois dismissed Brooks's suit ruling it presented a new context to which the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics does not extend. The court reasoned Brooks's case differed from previous Bivens cases, particularly Carlson v. Green, due to the duration of his medical issue and the involvement of supervisory personnel. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's reasoning. The court held Brooks's claim did not present a new context, as it was similar to Carlson v. Green, where a prisoner alleged constitutionally inadequate medical care. The court found the distinctions made by the district court regarding the duration of the medical issue and the involvement of supervisors were not sufficient to create a new context. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against the two supervisors, but vacated the dismissal of claims against the three treating personnel.

APPEAL/IDENTITY THEFT. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. Temitope Omotayo, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 8502 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 2025).

Omotayo, along with at least eleven co-conspirators, participated in an international scheme aimed at defrauding businesses in the United States. For his role in the fraud, Omotayo was convicted by a jury on charges of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering. He concedes that substantial evidence supported those convictions. The sole question before the court was whether Omotayo violated a federal law criminalizing “aggravated identity theft,” 18 USC 1028A, which carries a mandatory consecutive two-year prison term. At trial, the Government showed that Omotayo possessed and sent a co-conspirator two versions of a single counterfeit invoice, both of which included the real name of another person. The jury was instructed it could find Omotayo guilty of aggravated identity theft if the invoice had “a purpose, role, or effect with respect to the [wire fraud conspiracy].” It convicted Omotayo on that count. The Southern District of New York denied Omotayo’s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the aggravated identity theft charge. The jury convicted Omotayo on all three counts, and the district court sentenced him to forty-eight months on Counts One and Two, and twenty-four months on Count Five, to be served consecutively. Omotayo timely appealed arguing the Government’s evidence was insufficient to establish he used, transferred, or possessed Yulia Roytman’s name “during and in relation to” the wire fraud conspiracy, or that he acted “without lawful authority.” Soon after Omotayo’s conviction, the Supreme Court decided Dubin v. United States, which established that Section 1028A applies only where a “defendant’s misuse of another person’s means of identification is at the crux of what makes the underlying offense criminal.” The court agreed with Omotayo that his conviction could not stand in light of Dubin. The jury was instructed to apply a legal standard that is now plainly incorrect. Even if the jury had been correctly instructed under Dubin, the Government’s evidence was insufficient to show that Omotayo’s possession or transfer of the invoice played a key role in the wire fraud scheme. The court reversed Omotayo’s judgment of conviction as to the aggravated identity theft charge and remanded the case for further proceedings.