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SAMARITAN NEWSLETTER – February 3, 2025
The SAMARITAN-PROJECT prepares post-conviction and compassionate release motions under the direction of Attorney Tom Norrid. The Project retrieves documents at reasonable prices. The Project newsletter reports every winning published district court and court of appeals case for the week in review.
CR.RIS/DISPARITY/STACKING/USSG 1B1.13(b)(5). The Middle District of Georgia granted a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Pierre Cannon, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15526 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2025). Pending before the Court was a recommendation from the Magistrate Judge dated Nov. 19, 2024, that defendant, who was lawfully convicted of armed robbery and carjacking, should have his sentence cut by approximately 65% based in part upon non retroactive changes to the law under which he was sentenced. The Government objects to the recommendation. The Court agreed in part and disagreed in part with the recommendation. The Court agreed that defendant's motion for sentence reduction should be granted, but not for the reasons stated in the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. In 1995, Cannon was found guilty by a jury of four counts of robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 USC 1951, five counts of use of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence in violation of 18 USC 924(c), and one count of carjacking in violation of 18 USC 2119. The defendant was sentenced to a total imprisonment sentence of 1,313 months (109 years and 5 months)—essentially a life sentence for the 23 year-old get-away driver. Following a retroactive amendment to the guidelines that applied in his case, Cannon's sentence was later reduced in 2010 to 1,171 months (97 years and 7 months. The Court found that under the limited circumstances here, the disparity of Cannon's sentence compared to that of his co-defendants is of similar gravity to warrant a reduction of his sentence. Based on defendant's age at the time he committed the offense, the extraordinary disparity in the sentence he received compared to his co-defendants, his rehabilitation while in prison, the amount of time he has served on his sentence, his lack of danger to the community, and an analysis of the sentencing factors found at 18 USC 3553(a), the Court found that defendant's sentence should be reduced pursuant to USSG 1B1.13(b)(5). The court reduced defendant’s sentence to time served.
CR.RIS/FAMILY CIRCUMSTANCES. The District of Nebraska granted in part a CR.RIS motion in United States v. Williams, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11806 (D. Neb. Jan. 23, 2025). In Dec. 2009, a grand jury indicted Williams and ten co-defendants on marijuana-conspiracy charges. On July 20, 2010, a Superseding Indictment charged Williams with conspiring to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana ("Count I"), in violation of 21 USC 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(vii), and 846, and conspiring to launder money ("Count II") in violation of 18 USC 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i), and (h). The Court ultimately sentenced Williams to 480 months on Count I and 240 months on Count II, to run concurrently. The Court erred in failing to clarify that Williams received a criminal history score of 13 points at sentencing instead of the 19 originally calculated by probation in his PSR. Both parties agree that makes him eligible for reduction of sentence pursuant to Amendment 821 and 3582(c)(2). Williams stated the Court "accept[ed] [his] factual claims" that the mother of his minor daughter is incapacitated but, nevertheless, determined that unfortunate situation did not constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for relief on the basis that "such circumstances are 'not uncommon.'" He contended the reasoning would be improper as the Court would have had to either deviate from the definition set out in 1B1.13(b)(3)(A) or the 3553(a) factors. With respect to the latter, Williams argued the Court "erred by failing to grant a reduction under 1B1.13(b)(3)(A)" because it "faithfully applied the 3553(a) factors" and determined they supported a sentence reduction based on his unusually long sentence. The Court's analysis regarding the "gross disparity" between his original 40-year sentence and "the one he would likely receive today" was based in large part on what it viewed as the intervening "changes in law" affecting his current Guidelines range. But the Court did not properly account for the reduction resulting from Amendment 821. And the court agrees with Williams that it should. Williams's sentence on Count I as reduced to 335 months imprisonment.
CR.RIS/RECONSIDERATION/CLEMENCY. The District of Kansas granted in part United States v. Ataven Tatum, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13799 (D. Kan. Jan. 27, 2025). On Jan. 7, 2014, the Court sentenced defendant to 270 months. On Dec. 13, 2024, the Court overruled defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A) and Motion for Appointment of Counsel and his Motion for Judicial Recommendation to the Federal Bureau of Prisons for 12 Months RRC Placement - Six Months Halfway House And Six Months Home Confinement, both filed Sept. 20, 2024. This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion filed Jan. 7, 2025. The Court sustained in part defendant's motion. On Jan. 17, 2025, former President Joe Biden commuted defendant's sentence so that it will now expire on July 16, 2025. Because defendant has less than six months remaining on his sentence, he is eligible for placement at a residential reentry center ("RRC"). 18 USC 3624(c)(1) (to extent practicable, BOP shall ensure prisoner serves final part of term-up to 12 months-under conditions that afford him reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for reentry into community). Based on defendant's revised expected release date, the Court recommended to the BOP it consider defendant for placement at an RRC for the remaining term of his sentence.
CR.RIS/DEMENTIA/MEDICAL/CCE. The Eastern District of Michigan, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13446 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 21, 2025). Chambers was convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, income tax evasion, and engaging in a continuous criminal enterprise. Defendant was originally sentenced to life in prison, and then resentenced in 1992 to concurrent terms of life on Count 6 (Possession with Intent to Distribute in Excess of 50 Grams of Cocaine Base) and Count 15 (Continuing Criminal Enterprise), a consecutive five years of imprisonment on Count 9 (Possession of a Firearm in the Course of a Dangerous Felony), and a concurrent two years of imprisonment on Count 12. In 2021, the Court reduced defendant's life sentence on Count 6 to 405 months. Defendant's life sentence on Count 15, Continuing Criminal Enterprise, remains. Defendant moved for compassionate release under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A), citing his age and advance dementia. Defendant is currently suffering from advanced dementia. According to BOP medical professionals, defendant has advanced Lewy body dementia, extrapyramidal and movement disorder, dysphagia, hypermetropia, and prediabetes. He requires assistance from prison staff for all activities of daily living. The BOP describes Chambers's dementia as "end stage." The Court found that defendant's medical condition qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling reason under 3582(c)(1)(A), and a reduction in sentence is consistent with the policy statement in USSG § 1B1.10. The Release Plan indicates defendant qualifies for Medicaid and Social Security, and identified specific medical providers that defendant would visit. The Court found defendant's health status to be "extraordinary and compelling," and granted his motion for compassionate release. Defendant’s life sentence was reduced to time served.
APPEAL/CR.RIS. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded a CR.RIS denial in United States v. Akiba Matthews, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2025 (4th Cir. Jan. 29, 2025). Matthews appealed the district court’s order denying his fifth motion for
compassionate release under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A). The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. In March 2021, the district court granted Matthews’s first motion for compassionate release to which the Government consented, reducing his sentence to 20 years. As part of the agreement, Matthews waived his right to seek a further sentence reduction based on COVID-19. The district court granted the motion without explanation. Matthews filed a second motion for compassionate release in which he challenged his 18 USC 922(g)(1) conviction. The district court denied that motion due to the parties agreement. Matthews then filed his third and fourth motions for compassionate release in which he challenged his 18 USC 924(c) conviction. The district court denied those motions, again relying on the parties agreement. On appeal, the court explained Matthews had not waived his right to seek compassionate release on grounds apart from COVID-19. But the court nevertheless affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion. Matthews raised multiple grounds for relief in his fifth motion for compassionate release, and the Government engaged with the substance of the motion in its response in opposition. The district court denied the motion in a brief order, noting we had affirmed the denial of Matthews’s most recent motion for compassionate release and finding Matthews had not shown a change in circumstances demonstrating extraordinary and compelling reasons for a further sentence reduction. On appeal, Matthews argued the district court failed to consider any of his grounds for compassionate release. The court agreed the district court’s explanation was deficient. Matthews’s first motion was based on COVID-19, and his next three motions sought relief that is not available through a motion for compassionate release. United States v. Ferguson, 55 F.4th 262, 270-72 (4th Cir. 2022) (recognizing that defendant may not challenge validity of conviction in compassionate release motion). In contrast, his fifth motion raised some potentially valid grounds for compassionate release. Because the district court did not analyze those arguments in its order, the court cannot engage in meaningful appellate review. To ensure the district court considered Matthews’s arguments in support of his fifth motion for compassionate release the court vacated the district court’s order and remanded. Because Matthews’s release date is fast approaching, the mandate shall issue forthwith so that the district court may proceed without delay.
U.S. SUPREME COURT. In Andrew v. White, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 406 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 21, 2025). Brenda Andrew was convicted by an Oklahoma jury of murdering her husband, Rob Andrew, and was sentenced to death. During her trial, the prosecution introduced extensive evidence about her sex life and personal failings, which was later conceded to be irrelevant. Andrew argued in a federal habeas petition that this evidence was so prejudicial it violated the Due Process Clause. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) upheld her conviction finding some of the evidence about her extramarital affairs relevant but acknowledging that much of the other evidence was irrelevant. Despite this, the OCCA deemed the errors harmless. Two judges dissented, arguing that the prejudicial evidence undermined the fairness of the trial. In federal court the District Court denied relief, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating Andrew failed to cite clearly established federal law. The Tenth Circuit majority acknowledged the precedent set by Payne v. Tennessee but dismissed it as a pronouncement rather than a holding. Judge Bacharach dissented, arguing that the prejudicial evidence deprived Andrew of a fair trial. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Tenth Circuit erred in its interpretation. The Court clarified that Payne established that the Due Process Clause can protect against the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence that renders a trial fundamentally unfair. The Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the trial court's admission of irrelevant evidence was so prejudicial as to render Andrew's trial fundamentally unfair.
APPEAL/2254. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded Eugene Doerr v. Shinn, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1999(9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2025). Doerr was convicted in 1996 of kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder of Karen Bohl, and was sentenced to death by an Arizona state court judge. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court, Doerr filed a federal habeas petition which was partially denied by the district court. Doerr then moved for a stay and abeyance to present new claims in state court, including ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and intellectual disability under Atkins v. Virginia. The district court initially denied Doerr’s federal habeas petition finding his claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing procedurally defaulted. The court held ineffective assistance of state post conviction counsel did not constitute cause to excuse the procedural default. Doerr appealed, and while his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Martinez v. Ryan, which held ineffective assistance of state post- conviction counsel could excuse procedural default. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to reconsider Doerr’s ineffective assistance claim in light of Martinez. On remand, the district court again denied relief on the ineffective assistance claim but granted relief on another claim. Doerr appealed the partial denial. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and granted Doerr’s motion to remand to the district court with instructions to stay and abey the federal habeas petition. The court held that the criteria for a stay and abeyance under Rhines v. Weber were met, allowing Doerr to present his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and intellectual disability under Atkins to the state court. The court found Doerr had good cause for not previously bringing these claims, that the claims were potentially meritorious, and there was no indication of intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceeding
APPEAL/2254. The Sixth Circuit granted a 2254 motion in Louis Chandler v. Brown, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1589 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 2025). Louis Chandler is a Michigan prisoner who was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty-five to seventy-five years in prison. Chandler filed a habeas corpus petition claiming the trial court infringed his right to present a complete defense. The district court denied the petition and Chandler appealed. The Western District of Michigan initially reviewed the case and denied Chandler's habeas corpus petition. Chandler argued the trial court's refusal to delay the trial, exclusion of key witnesses, and prevention of presenting critical evidence violated his constitutional rights. The Michigan Court of Appeals found the trial court had abused its discretion by denying Chandler's requests for an adjournment, barring his witnesses, and excluding evidence of the victim's prior false allegations. However, the appellate court affirmed Chandler's conviction concluding the errors were not outcome determination under the state's non-constitutional error standard. The Sixth Circuit found the trial court's actions significantly undermined Chandler's ability to present a complete defense. The court held that the exclusion of evidence and witnesses critical to Chandler's defense violated his constitutional rights. The court concluded the errors had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict, creating grave doubt about the trial's fairness. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, conditionally granted Chandler's habeas corpus petition, and remanded the case with instructions to order Chandler's release unless the State of Michigan grants him a new trial within ninety days.
APPEAL/2241/PLRA. The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded Christopher Cobb v. Warden, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2083 (11th Cir. Jan. 30, 2025). Cobb who proceede pro se appealed the district court’s order dismissing his 28 USC 2241 habeas corpus petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On appeal, he argued he has standing to bring the challenges he raised in his 2241 petition, that the district court improperly applied the exhaustion requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, (the “PLRA”), to his 2241 petition when the PLRA’s exhaustion requirements do not apply and the court erred in dismissing his petition on exhaustion grounds when he was not required to exhaust any remedies, as doing so would have been futile. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. After Cobb filed his 2241 petition—which challenges the calculation of his sentence under the First Step Act, 18 USC 3632, et seq., and the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Act—the Warden moved to dismiss it. The Warden made two threshold arguments. First, he argued that Cobb lacked Article III standing to facially challenge the First Step Act. Specifically, the Warden argued Cobb had not suffered an injury-in-fact and the injury Cobb alleged was not redressable by the relief he sought. Second, the Warden argued Cobb had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his 2241 petition. The Warden separately argued that, if the court reached the meritof Cobb’s petition, it should be denied. The district court erred in failing to determine whether it had jurisdiction over Cobb’s petition. Standing “is a threshold jurisdictional question which must be addressed prior to and independent of the merits of a party’s claims.” The court concluded the district court erred by not addressing the jurisdictional issue (standing) before reaching the merits of the non-jurisdictional issue (exhaustion).
APPEAL/GRAND JURY. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated July 21, 2023, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1924 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025). An individual who is referred to as "Client," became the target of a criminal investigation into alleged tax evasion. The grand jury issued a subpoena to Client, who invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to produce documents. Subsequently, the grand jury subpoenaed the law firm that had represented Client in tax matters requesting documents related to that representation and instructing the firm to provide a privilege log if any documents were withheld. The law firm declined to produce certain documents or provide a privilege log, citing attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, and Client’s Fifth Amendment rights. The Central District of California ordered the law firm to provide the Government with a privilege log rejecting the firm's assertion of Client’s Fifth Amendment rights. The district court temporarily stayed enforcement of its order and Client filed an interlocutory appeal. The Ninth Circuit held that an attorney cannot be compelled to provide the Government with a privilege log of documents protected under Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The court explained that providing a privilege log would reveal the existence, authenticity, and Client’s custody of the documents, thus undermining Client’s Fifth Amendment act-of-production privilege. The court determined that to assess whether the documents are indeed protected under Fisher, the district court should conduct an in camera review. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to conduct an in camera review to determine the applicability of the Fisher privilege.
APPEAL/RESENTENCE. The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing United States v. Joseph Penson, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1873 (11th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025). Penson has twice been sentenced to supervised releas and he has violated his conditions for release both times. His first stint of supervised release was revoked after he was arrested for driving under the influence. So was his second. This second time the district court sentenced Penson to 18-months imprisonment with 18-months’ supervised release to follow. Penson challenged both components of that sentence. He maintains his prison sentence is substantively unreasonable and his term of supervised release exceeds the statutory maximum. The court disagreed with his first argument but agreed with the second. Penson’s prison sentence is substantively reasonable, but—as the Government acknowledges—the district court erred by imposing a term of supervised release exceeding five months. The court affirmed Penson’s prison sentence, vacated his term of supervised release, and remanded. The court agreed with Penson his 18-month supervised release sentence exceeds the limit established by 18 USC 3583(h).
APPEAL/SUPV. REL. TERMINATION. The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded United States v. William Kamal, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2122 (11th Cir. Jan. 30, 2025), Kamal appealed the denial of his motion for early termination of supervised release. 18 USC 3583(e)(1). Kamal argued the district court denied his motion without identifying a reasoned basis for its ruling. Because there is not “enough, in the record or the [district] court’s order, to allow for meaningful appellate review of its decision,” the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. In 2004, Kamal pled guilty to one count of using interstate commerce to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity in violation of 18 USC 2422(b). The district court sentenced Kamal to 60 months of imprisonment followed by a life term of supervised release.
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